The first iteration moved signing from the Cloudflare worker into this
repo's CI to fix the worker-as-sign-oracle defect. The re-review pointed
out that this just relocated the trust problem: anyone who lands a
commit on main gets the resulting bytes signed automatically. Mitigations:
* CODEOWNERS — sign-script, build scripts, the workflow itself, and
the auto-generated index/sig files are owned by the registry owner.
Combined with branch protection requiring CODEOWNERS review, a PR
touching the signing infrastructure or the artefacts it produces
cannot land without explicit owner sign-off. Plugin contributions
under plugins/<name>/ are covered by the standard PR-review rules
but don't trip CODEOWNERS unless they touch the signing path.
* SHA-pinned actions — actions/checkout@v4 and actions/setup-node@v4
replaced with full-SHA refs (v4.2.2 / v4.1.0). Blocks
action-supply-chain swaps (a malicious mutable tag move on a
popular action would otherwise execute in the same job that has
REGISTRY_PRIVATE_KEY in scope).
* Post-sign self-verify — a new step verifies plugins-index.json.sig
against the committed pubkey (not a secret) BEFORE the .sig hits
main. Catches a buggy sign-script run, an env-leak that produces
zero-bytes output, or a half-applied edit.
* REGISTRY_PRIVATE_KEY env scope — explicitly noted in workflow
comment that the secret is on the sign step ONLY (where it was
already), not the job. Prevents future contributors lifting it
to job-level out of convenience.
* In-workflow security model docstring — enumerates the residual
threat model (compromised maintainer, malicious PR, sign-step
bug, leaked refresh token) and what each defense addresses.
Trust root is now: GitHub branch protection on main + CODEOWNERS on
sign infrastructure + SHA-pinned actions + post-sign verification.
A maintainer with push rights can still ship malicious bytes through
a code-review bypass — that residual is the same as for any signed
package registry and falls outside what CI alone can mitigate.
Branch protection on `main` MUST be configured by an org admin to
match the assumptions in CODEOWNERS:
- require pull request reviews (at least 1)
- require review from CODEOWNERS
- dismiss stale approvals on new commits
- restrict who can push directly to main (org admins only)
Evan Hu
786cbd496a